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ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
BRIEF OF THE COMMITTEES ON CIVIL RIGHTS,
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, AND SEX AND LAW
OF THE ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THECITY
OF NEWYORK AS AMICUS CURIAE IN SUPPORT
OF RESPONDENT, ANN B. HOPKINS
 
The Committees on Civil Rights, Labor and Em-
ployment Law, and Sex and Law of The Association of the
Bar of the City of New York (the “Association”), with the
consent of counsel to both parties, respectfully submit this
















The Association is an Organization of about 18,000
The Association is committed to the Principle of€qual opportunity for all in the workplace, regardless of race,
the legal profession.
From 1870, when the Association was formed, until1937, women were not admitted to membership. Today, 18%
Secretary of the Association and several members of the As-Sociation’s Executive Committee, including its Chair, are
Standing and special Committees and head more than twentyof those committees. In light ofits history, purpose and mem-
adverse effects and the importance ofits elimination.
Although sex discrimination in the professions un-deniably has been reduced in recent years, the Association isconcerned that subtle barriers continue to prevent womenfrom advancing to their fullest potential. Since 1869, whenBelle Babb Mansfield in Mt. Pleasant, Iowa, becamethe firstwoman to be admitted to a state bar in the United States,women have made great strides forward in their search forequality. Yet studies show that womencontinue to lag behindmen, particularly at the highest levels of the professions.
= 2
The Association has a strong interest in ensuring
that Title VII is implemented to its fullest extent to eliminate
illegal barriers to employment and advancementin the profes-
sions. Because discrimination in the professions tends to be
subtle, the Association believes that evidence of sex stereotyp-
ing can and will be the foundation of a Title VI claim in
many cases. In this case, both the district court and the court
of appeals found that sex stereotyping tainted the decision-
making process with regard to respondent. Thus, the Associa-
tion believes that the decision of the court of appeals should
be affirmed.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Title VII prohibits the erection of barriers to em-
ployment on the basis of discrimination because of an em-
ployee’s race, sex, religion or national origin. Limitations on
employment opportunities because of such classifications
have been described as:
“one of the most deplorable forms of dis-
crimination knownto our society, for it deals not with
just an individual’s sharing in the ‘outer benefits’ of
being an Americancitizen, but rather the ability to pro-
vide decently for one’s family in a job or profession for
which he qualifies or chooses.”
Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals Co., 421 F.2d 888, 891 (Sth Cir.
1970); accord Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 354
(Sth Cir. 1972). Such limitations not only defy current stan-
dards of decency, they prevent the full utilization of human
potential in the workplace.
Sex stereotyping -- that is, the expectation that an
individual will or should behave in a particular way because
 
of his or her gender -- permeates society. Sex stereotypes
undoubtedly underlie certain types of employmentdecisions,
particularly those that are made on subjective bases. Advance-
ment in the professions is especially susceptible to taint from
discrimination rooted in stereotyped expectations, because
election to partnership, tenure or their equivalent is frequently
the result of evaluating subjective criteria in a consensus
rather than majority rule setting. Because claims of such dis-
crimination can be difficult to prove, it is imperative that this
Court make clear that Title VII is offended if an employment
decision is tainted by sex-role expectations.
The record in this case amply supports the district
court’s conclusion that respondent was the victim of inten-
tional sex discrimination. At a minimum, Ms. Hopkins estab-
lished that Price Waterhouse’s initial decision to deny her
partnership was tainted by evaluations infected by sex stereo-
typed expectations. Moreover, respondent’s mentor, who was
entrusted with the task of explaining to her why she was not
made a partner in 1982, advised her that she could succeed if
she would “walk more femininely, talk more femininely, wear
make-up, have her hair styled and wear jewelry” —- i.e., if
she would behave morelike some of the men of Price Water-
house thought a woman should behave.
ARGUMENT
I. Sex Stereotyping Affects Employment Decisions in
the Professions.
Abundantsocial science research indicates that sex
stereotyping -- expectations of how men and women should
and do act -- affects thinking across a surprisingly vast
demographic cross-section of American society. See generally
J. Chafetz, Masculine/Feminine or Human? An Overview of The
Sociology of Sex Roles (1974); L. Duberman, Gender and Sex in
Society (1975); Bem, The Measurement of Psychological Androg-
yny, 42 J. Consulting & Clinical Psychology 155, 157 (1974);
Coser & Rokoff, Women in the Occupational World: Social Dis-
ruption and Conflict, 18 Soc. Probs. 535, 540 (1971). 1/  Ac-
cording to these stereotypes, men should be aggressive, inde-
pendent, and capable; women should be soft, sensitive and
subservient. These perceptions are rooted in centuries of west-
ern thought about the roles of men and women. Although ex-
pectations of the woman’s role are often engendered by pater-
nalism, and therefore may be perceived to be benign, they
nonetheless have the effect of preventing women from sharing
fully in all levels of society. Taub, Keeping Women in Their
Place: Stereotyping Per Se as a Form of Employment Discrimina-
tion, 21 B.C.L. Rev. 345, 349-50 (1980).
With regard to sex stereotyping, certain behavior
maybe acceptable if exhibited by those of one gender, but not
by those of the other. For example, a woman who behaves
“like a man” -- aggressively and independently -- will fre-
quently be judged to be unpleasant or “bitchy.” The more
“counter-stereotypic” she is -- i.e., the more aggressive and
independent -- the more disproportionately negative the reac-
tions to her will be. Jd. at 395-96. Yet the same behavior in a
man will be perceived as appropriate and, thus, not unpleas-
ant.
 
Vy Even women themselves tend to attribute particular behavior and
attributes to other women. See Goldberg, Are Women Prejudiced Against
Women?, 5 Trans-Action, Apr. 1968, at 28.
 
Sex-role expectations have a tremendous impact on
the work place. Occupations that require assertive, intellec-
tual, energetic behavior are thought to be “masculine,” while
Service occupations are thought to be “feminine.” When
women pursue “masculine” occupations, they tend to be
judged more harshly than men. Nieva & Gutek, Sex Effects on
Evaluation, 5 Academy of Management Review 267, 271-73
(1980); Rosen & Jerdee, Effect of Applicant’s Sex and Difficulty
of Job on Evaluations of Candidates for Managerial Positions, 59
J. of Applied Psychology 511 (1974). One study, for example,
found that people rated the same essay higher if told it was
written by a manthanif told it was written by a woman, when
the essayinvolved politics, a “male” subject. Paludi & Strayer,
What’s in an Author’s Name? Differential Evaluations of Perform-
ance as a Function of Author’s Name, 12 Sex Roles 353 (1985).
In addition, womenstriving for success in some “masculine”
fields are confronted with a Catch-22: Women whose behav-
ior conforms to the requirements of the “masculine” jobs are
deemed “unfeminine,” and therefore inappropriate for ad-
vancement. But women whose behavior conforms more
closely to the feminine stereotype may be perceived as not
assertive enough for the “masculine” job. As a result, women
not only are underrepresented in male-dominated occupa-
tions, they are channeledinto the less lucrative, less responsi-
ble, less prestigious jobs within the occupations. Epstein, En-
countering the Male Establishment: Sex Status Limits on Women’s
Careers in the Professions, 75 Am. J. of Sociology 965, 974
(1970). And this occurs, not on the basis of an accurate as-
sessment of an individual’s merits, but on the basis of some
preconceived notion of how a person ought to behave based
on his or her sex.
 
Times have clearly changed since three Justices of
the Highest Court wrote that “the natural and propertimidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits
it for many of the occupations of civil life. ... The para-
mount destiny and mission of womenare to fulfill the noble
and benign offices of wife and mother.” Bradwell v. Illinois,
16 Wall. 130, 21 L.Ed. 442 (1873) (Bradley, J., concurring).
The experience of the legal profession is illustrative. Although
only 6% of the lawyers were women in 1968, women now
comprise 20% of those who are lawyers. A.B.A. Journal,
June 1, 1988, at 6. Further, 41.5% of the students in law
school are women. /d. at 50.
But while women have made great strides toward
acceptance in the legal profession since the days when they
were denied membership in the bar, Bradwell v. Illinois, supra,
enrollment at law schools, 2/ or employment with law
firms, 3/ disparities between the opportunities for female and
male lawyers within the legal profession persist. For example,
only 8% of partners at large law firms are women, and that
figure has risen only 1% since 1982. A.B.A. Journal, June 1,
1988 at 70. Moreover, women who are lawyers tend to earn
less than male lawyers, even within subgroups. The median
income of womenassociates is 83% that of men associates; of
women partners is 68% of men partners; and of women solo
practitioners is 53% of men solo practitioners. Jd. at 72.
2/ Washington & Lee Law School denied women admittance until
1972. Trial, August 8, 1983, at 84.
3/ It is estimated that as of 1968, only 40 women had worked for
Wall Street law firms. C. F. Epstein, Women in Law 176 (1981).
Women law professors similarly are disproportionately repre-
sented, particularly at the tenure level, and particularly at the
more prestigious law schools. 4/ Jd. at 53.
Mistaken attitudes about women as lawyers also
permeate the profession. While overt sex discrimination is
now rare, women are subjected to a subtler form of discrimi-
nation. In its report to the Chief Judge of the State of New
York, The New York Task Force on Women in the Courts
found that female lawyers are often treated in an unprofes-
sional manner. The Report of the New York Task Force on
Women in the Courts (1986).
Of particular importance for this case, the Report
found that, whereas aggressive behavior by male attorneys
was rewarded or tolerated, it was viewed as inappropriate
from female attorneys. Jd. at 230-32. One woman who was
surveyed wrote:
“[I]f a male attorney objects repeatedly dur-
ing trial he is ‘going all out for his client’ and is ‘a real
fighter.’ If a female attorney objects similarly, she is a
‘bitch’ or a ‘tough broad.’ Do you knowone attorney
actually came over andtried to kiss me to seal his vic-
tory after a hard foughttrial?” .
Anotherstated:
“Judges, counsel and court personnel will act
more favorable towards women whofit their percep-
tions of a ‘good’ woman, good meaning one whoacts
 
a} During the 1986-87 academic year, five of the 56 tenured posi-
tions at Harvard werefilled by women; none of the 22 at the University
of Chicago, one of the 39 at the University of Michigan, and two of the




‘appropriately,’ e.g., feminine, helples
s, who defer to
the ‘better judgment’ of men.”
Confirming these impressions, a
survey reported in the
American Bar Association Journal sho
wed that male lawyers
perceived that the greatest weakne
ss of female lawyers was
that they were “too emotional and
abrasive.” 69 A.B.A. Jour-
nal 1383, 1384 (Oct. 1983) (emphasi
s added).
Inappropriate treatment of women
not only offends
general notions of dignity and decency,
it can also impede the
effectiveness of a female attorney
advancing her case. It can
damage not only the confidence of
the attorney, but the confi-
dence of the client in the attorney
’s abilities as well. The Re-
port of the New York Task Force on Wo
men in the Courts, supra
p. 8, at 211-12. Inappropriate tre
atment perpetuates inaccu-
rate perceptions of women, and the
reby prevents society from
drawing fully on all of its resources
.
Advancement to partnership in the p
rofessions is
particularly susceptible to taint fr
om discriminatory stereotyp-
ing, for a number of reasons. F
irst, partnership decisions
often involve subjective criteria. Su
ccessful professionals pos-
sess attributes -- like creativity, energ
y, ambition, confidence,
personability and facility with lan
guage —- that are particu-
larly difficult to measure and bala
nce. Moreover, distinguish-
ing between good and superior p
erformance, as is required
for advancement decisions about
professionals, requires the
exercise of subtle judgment by the
decisionmakers. Epstein,
supra p. 6, at 971.
While reliance on subjective criteri
a within an unde-
fined framework often is necessa
ry for decisions concerning
advancement in the professions,
and as such is neither im-
propernorillegal per se, see, @.8.,
Rogers v. International Paper
-9-
Co., 510 F.2d 1340, 1345 (8th Cir.), vacated and remanded on
other grounds, 423 U.S. 809 (1975), such reliance poses a dan-
ger: subjective criteria are more easily infected by stereotyp-
ing than objective criteria. Jd. Decisionmakers may unlawfully
give greater effect to sex-role expectations if they are judging
a candidate’s personality or general performance than meas-
uring her upper bodystrength or calculating her score on a
civil service test.
In addition, any underlying stereotyping typically
goes unstated. Thus even if the ultimate decisionmaker -- or
in a partnership, most of the decisionmakers -- is committed
to equal opportunity, a tainted evaluation may evade detection
and taint the process. Newman, Remedies for Discrimination in
Supervisorial and Managerial Jobs, 13 Harv. C.R. - C.L. L.
Rev. 631, 644 (1978).
Further, partnerships (the form of organization
adopted by most professional firms) are operated on a col-
legial basis, so that partners often search for a consensus,
rather than commit themselves to governance by majority
rule. Such a system empowers a small numberof partners to
veto a candidate’s application, which increases the likelihood
that discrimination will taint a partnership decision.
Finally, interaction in partnerships, particularly at
the upperlevel, is often characterized by a “club-like” atmos-
phere. To maintain this atmosphere, some decisionmakers
may choose to select “one of their own,” and thereby exclude
minorities and women from joining their ranks. Epstein, supra
p. 6, at 968. As a result of the manner in which partnership
decisions are reached, successful Title VI claims involving





Other factors make claims of discrimination in the
professions harder to prove than claims involving lower level
jobs. Because those with greater education and worldliness are
more knowledgeable abouttheillegality of sex discrimination,
they are less likely to make express sexist comments or pro-
vide other direct evidence of discriminatory intent. In addi-
tion, fewer people typically are considered for partnership
than are considered for advancementin lowerlevel jobs. As a
result, the pool of comparison is smaller, making a claim of
discrimination harder to prove. Bartholet, Application of Title
VII to Jobs in High Places, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 947, 998 (1982).
This problem is exacerbated by the fact that women and mi-
norities generally have not competed for professional jobs un-
til recently, so that an historical framework is of relatively
minor probative value.In light of these limitations, reliance on
evidence of decisionmaking tainted by sex-role expectations
is often critical to establishing a violation of Title VII.
II. A Violation of Title VII Occurs if An Employment
Decision is Tainted by Evaluations Incorporating
Disappointed Sex-Role Assumptions.
Title VII prohibits limitations on employment on the
basis of sex. The purpose ofTitle VII is to eliminate discrimi-
natory barriers to employment, and thereby to ensure eq
ual
opportunity of employment for all, regardless of group
affili-
ation. 5/ Title VII does not accord greater rights to wom
en
and minorities; it simply ensures that they are judged, as indi-
viduals, by the same criteria as others are judged.
 




Although more Title VII claims have been asserted
by lower level workers, white collar workers and professionals
are also covered by the Act. In 1972, Congress amendedTi-
tle VII to cover university faculty positions and federal gov-
ernmentpositions. 6/ At the same time, Congress rejected a
proposal to exempt physicians from those protected under the
statute. 7/ More recently, this Court held that if parties agree
to have a lawyer-employee considered for partnership in a
law firm, that agreement is a “term, condition, or privilege”
of employment covered by Title VI. Hishon v. King & Spald-
ing, 467 U.S. 69 (1984).
As noted above, sex discrimination in the profes-
sions tends to take the form not of blatant sexism, but rather
of subtle sex-role expectations. This Court, having identified
(Continued)
reprinted in 1964 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2391, 2401; see also
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971); Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 768 n.28 (1976).
8/ Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261,
§ 3, 86 Stat. 103, 103-04 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-1 (1976)).
ay Sen. Javits stated, in opposition to the proposal:
“One of the things that those discriminated against have re-
sented the mostis that they are relegated to the position of the
sawers of wood and the drawers of water; that only the blue-
collar jobs and ditchdigging jobs are reserved for them; and
that though they built America, and certainly helped build it
enormously in the days of its basic construction, they cannot
ascend the higher rungs in professional and otherlife.
Yet, this amendment would go back beyond decadesofstruggle
and of injustice, and reinstate the possibility of discrimination




a right under Title VII to equal opportunity for professional
advancement, is now confronted with determining the most
effective means of ensuring that the right is protected.
This Court has recognized that, in passing Title VI,
“Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of dispa-
rate treatment of men and womenresulting from sex stereo-
types.” Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978); see also County of Washington v.
Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 180 (1981). The Gunther Court noted,
“As Congress itself has indicated, a ‘broad approach’ to the
definition of equal employment opportunity is essential to
overcoming and undoing the effect of discrimination.” 452
U.S. at 178 (citing S. Rep. No. 867, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 12
(1964)). Judging a person more harshly or negatively because
she does not behave in a typically feminine way -- thatis,
because of a stereotype -- is discrimination violative of Ti-
tle VII. The expectation is inappropriate because it arises by
reference to the employee’s groupaffiliation, not by reference
to the employee’s individual attributes.
Although the district court and the dissenting judge
of the court of appeals suggested that this case involves a
newform of discrimination, that is definitely not the case. An
employment decision using evaluations founded on sex-role
(Continued)
confined to physicians or surgeons, one of the highest rungs of
the ladder that any member of a minority could attain -- and
thus lock in and fortify the idea that being a doctor or a sur-
geonis just too good for members of a minority, and that they
have to be subject to discrimination in respect of it, and the
Federal law will not protect them.”
118 Cong. Rec. 3802 (1972).
-~13-
 
expectations is discrimination with which the courts long have
been familiar. This Court has recognized that “[p]ractices that
classify employees in terms of religion, race, or sex tend to
preserve traditional assumptions about groups rather than
thoughtful scrutiny of individuals” and therefore violate Ti-
tle VI. Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435
U.S. 702, 709 (1978). In Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
333-34 & n.17 (1977), the Court noted that the bona fide oc-
cupational qualification exception does not apply if the refusal
to employ is based on stereotypic assumptions.
Federal courts routinely reject job limitations on the
basis of stereotyped expectations. See, e.g., Fadhi v. City and
County of San Francisco, 741 F.2d 1163 (9th Cir. 1984) (liabil-
ity may be established where treatment of police officer
trainee was the result of bias against women, as evidenced by
such comments as “[she is] too much like a woman,” and
“Ishe is] very ladylike at all times, which in the future may
cause problems”). A woman must be given the opportunity to
showshe is strong enough to perform a particular job, rather
than be denied the job outright on the assumption that most
women would be too weak. Rosenfeld v. Southern Pacific Co.,
444 F.2d 1219, 1225 (9th Cir. 1971); see also Vant Hul v. City
of Dell Rapids, 462 F. Supp. 828 (D.S.D. 1978) (defendant’s
preference for a “big man [who] could handle things” repre-
sented sex stereotyping illegal under Title VII). Rather than
being rejected for a position, a woman must herself be free to
decide whether a job is too dangerous. Weeks v. Southern Bell
Tel. and Tel. Co., 408 F.2d 228, 236 (Sth Cir. 1969). A woman
must be trusted to choose her own “business clothes,” and
maynot be relegated to wearing a uniform when men in com-
parable positions may wear business suits. Carroll v. Talman
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 604 F.2d 1028, 1033 (7th Cir. 1979),
#1d =
 
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 929 (1980). A woman must be permit-
ted to continue her employment as a flight attendant upon
becoming a mother if men attendants are permitted to con-
tinue their employment upon becoming fathers. Jn re Consoli-
dated Pretrial Proceedings in the Airline Cases, 582 F.2d 1142,
1147 (7th Cir. 1978) (“[A]ssumptions steeped in cultural
stereotypes, such as that female parents have a more intense
concern for their children than male parents . . . are inconsis-
tent with the purposes of the Act.”), reversed on other grounds
sub nom. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385 (1982).
Job limitations on the basis of racial stereotypes are
also illegal. Title VII is implicated where an interviewer has “a
tendency to equate pleasant personality characteristics, and
particularly an ability to work well with others, with white peo-
ple.” Robbins v. White-Wilson Medical Clinic, 660 F.2d 1064,
1068 (Sth Cir. 1981), vacated and remanded on other grounds,
456 U.S. 969 (1982). In another instance, a court found that
blacks who did not conform to the expectations of their white
supervisors were criticized for being too aggressive and too
abrasive. Segar v. Civiletti, 508 F. Supp. 690, 706 (D.D.C.
1981), modified on other grounds sub nom. Segar v. Smith, 738
F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1115
(1985).
Perhaps the best example of how employmentdeci-
sions based on disappointed stereotyped expectations consti-
tute discrimination is the case of the “uppity black.” Cer-
tainly, one whofires a black because he fails to act in a sub-
servient manner would be said to violate Title VII. See
1968-1973 EEOC Dec. No. 70-198 (CCH) { 6087 (1969).
Like the black who does not “shuffle,” the woman who does
not act softly and demurely is protected from limitations on
-15-
 
her employment because of her counter-stereotypic behavior.
See Vuyanich v. Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 409 F. Supp.
1083, 1089 (N.D. Tex. 1976) (plaintiff dismissed from job
states a claim of sex and race discrimination under Title VI
where supervisor “told her that she probably did not need a
job anyway, because her husband was a Caucasian”).
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”) has concluded that sex stereotyping is illegal under
Title VI. 8/ Thus, the EEOC prohibits employment limita-
tions on the ground that a woman but not a manis married,
or on the assumption that the turnover rate is higher among
women then men. 29 C.F.R. §§ 1604.2(a)(1)(i); 1604.4.
Moreover, the EEOC guidelines expressly state that a bona
fide occupational qualification may not be based on:
“It]he refusal to hire an individual based on stereo-
typed characterizations of the sexes. Such stereotypes
include, for example, that men are less capable of as-
sembling intricate equipment: that womenare less ca-
pable of aggressive salesmanship. The principle of
nondiscrimination requires that individuals be consid-
ered on the basis of individual capacities and not on
the basis of any characteristics generally attributed to
the group.”
29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)(1) (ii).
Thus, denying an applicant a job on the basis of an
unsatisfied sex-role expectation, or denying a candidate part-
 
8/ This Court, of course, looks to the guidelines of the EEOC for
guidance in interpreting Title VII. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB vy. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986).
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nership on the basis of an unsatisfied sex-role expectation,is
denying a candidate advancementbecauseof her sex in viola-
tion of Title VI. 9/
III. Evidence of Decisionmaking on the Basis of
Disappointed Sex-Role Expectations Established
a Violation of Title VII in this Case.
When the evaluation of a woman’s behavior is
tainted by considerations of how a woman “ought” to behave,
she is not being judged on the basis of her individual abilities
and has therefore been subjected to discrimination violative of
Title VI. The record in this case clearly supports the trial
court’s finding that the decision of Price Waterhouse to put
respondent on the “hold”list in 1982, rather than make her a
partner, was discriminatory.
The parties agree that respondent established a
prima facie case of sex discrimination. She was manifestly
qualified for partnership. Not only was her workof the highest
calibre, but she brought more business to the firm than any of
the eighty-seven men considered for partnership in her year.
Price Waterhouse then articulated its reason for denying
Ms. Hopkins’ partnership -- she was deemed too aggressive
 
9/ In cases brought under the equal protection clause, this Court like-
wise has recognized that differential treatment based on role-typing is
prohibited. Social welfare programs that are based on the assumptionthat
men and not womenare breadwinnersare invalid. Califano v. Westcott,
443 U.S. 76 (1979); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199 (1977). Do-
mestic relations legislation embodying the stereotyped expectation that
women remain at home has also been struck down. Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S.
268 (1979). Similarly, legislation based on the belief that females are
more mature than males between the ages of 18 and 21 has been held to




and too abrasive for elevation. Ample evidence supports the
conclusion that these personality traits were viewed negatively
because they did not conform to the stereotype of “proper”
female behavior.
Respondent presented evidence that her evaluations
were colored by comments about her counter-stereotypical
behavior. One critic wrote that Ms. Hopkins would benefit
from a “course at charm school.” A supporter suggested that
Ms. Hopkins cameacrossinitially as “macho,” but “if you get
around the personality thing, she’s at the top of the list or way
above average.” In response to the Admissions Committee’s
investigating Ms. Hopkins’ use of profanity, which was re-
garded by “several. . . partners” as “one of the negatives,” a
supporter rejoined that such concerns arose only “because she
is a lady using foul language.”
That these comments are based on sex generaliza-
tions seems obvious. Nonetheless, Ms. Hopkins offered the
testimony of Dr. Susan Fiske, a social psychologist, to con-
firm that sexism underlay some of the evaluations. For exam-
ple, Dr. Fiske noted that the same assertive behavior by
Ms. Hopkins was interpreted in a positive way by some
evaluators, and in a negative way by others. Moreover, those
that evaluated Ms. Hopkins negatively were vehemently nega-
tive. Such a strong negative reaction, according to Dr. Fiske,
is an indication of a disappointed sex-role expectation. Many
of the studies cited at pp. 5-6, supra, support Dr. Fiske’s testi-
mony.
Petitioner asserts that the evidence presented by
Ms. Hopkins fails to establish a causal relationship between
the sexist comments and the decision. It suggests, first, that
the evidence fails to establish that the process was tainted, in
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that the comments do not reflect the views of the ultimate
decisionmakers. Such a view disregards the mechanism of the
decisionmaking process -- the Price Waterhouse Policy Board
relied on the evaluations of the partners who commented
about Ms. Hopkins in rendering its decision.
Further, petitioner asserts that evidence of remarks
by supporters is irrelevant to the trial court’s inquiry. But the
fact that in some instances it was supporters who couched
their evaluations in terms of Ms. Hopkins’ sex does not ren-
der the evidence immaterial. Whether made by a supporter or
a detractor, the comments made about Ms. Hopkinsillustrate
an orientation of sex-role generalizations within the
workplace. That is shown by the fact that one of the support-
ers used sex—based language to explain the negative reaction
of some of Ms. Hopkins’ detractors to her use of profanity. In
addition, while one evaluator may have decided that Ms. Hop-
kins’ advantages outweighed a “macho” personality, his nota-
tion of the “macho” personality enabled another decision-
maker to balance that factor differently.
Petitioner also trivializes direct evidence that the
Policy Board’s conclusion was substantially influenced by sex
stereotyping. In deciding to put Ms. Hopkins’ name on the
“hold” list, the Policy Board noted that, although she had “a
lot of talent,” she needed “social grace.” And ThomasBeyer,
who was found by the district court to have been entrusted
with explaining the Policy Board’s decision to Ms. Hopkins,
advised her “to walk more femininely, talk more femininely,
dress more femininely, wear make up, have her hair styled,
and wear jewelry,” if she hoped to become a partner the fol-
lowing year. It is hard to imagine stronger evidence that the
decision to deny respondent an otherwise deserved partner-
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ship was tainted by impermissible expectations on the basis of
sex. 10/
The record also reflects that Price Waterhouse’s
decisionmaking process was susceptible of discriminatory
taint, 11/ and that such taint in fact infected the process as
applied to Ms. Hopkins. The Price Waterhouse proceduresre-
lied heavily on written evaluations of subjective criteria, un-
guided by any standards. As discussed above, such a system
risks taint from discriminatory decisionmaking. Further, the
firm’s procedure gave powerful effect to short-form evalu-
ations submitted by partners who had limited contact with a
candidate, and hence less opportunity for her to counter the
negative reaction engendered by disappointed sex-role expec-
tations by force of her performance. Because Price Water-
house, like manyfirms, operated by consensus, this type of
form would increase the dangerthat tainted evaluations would
prevent certain candidates from being advanced to partner-
ship. Moreover, the difficulty of ensuring equal opportunity
10/ Petitioner’s suggestion that Beyer’s comments were simply his own
well-intentioned ideas about how respondent could succeed the following
year, rather than evidence of what factors underlay the decision (Pet. Br.
at 15, n.3), is, ironically, further evidence that sex stereotyping still per-
sists at Price Waterhouse. It reflects the well-documented phenomenon
that stereotyping is rooted in paternalism and hence is perceived as be-
nign. (See supra, p. 5.)
11/- Because the parties will familiarize the Court fully with the Price
Waterhouse procedures, the Association will dispense with a description




for womenis increased where men evaluate womenin a tradi-
tionally male profession and a male working environment. 12/
This record amply supports the conclusion that the
denial of partnership to Ms. Hopkins was impermissibly in-
fected by sex stereotyping. Petitioner’s brief, raising novel is-
sues of law, is simply camouflage to confuse a rather straight-
forward claim. By concerning itself with mixed motive analy-
sis, petitioner sidesteps the abundant evidence demonstrating
that the decisionmaking process with regard to Ms. Hopkins
was impermissibly tainted by disappointed sex-role expecta-
tions.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, the Association,
through its Committees on Civil Rights, Labor and Employ-
ment Law, and Sex and Law, urges this Court to affirm the
decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit.
12/,— At trial, Ms. Hopkins presented testimony from Dr. Fiske to dem-
onstrate the risks of taint within the Price Waterhouse decisionmaking
process. While the social psychologist did not add to the foundation of
the plaintiff’s case, she helped interpret it. She pointed out, for example,
that short forms exacerbated underlying sex sterotyping, and that where
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